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Health targets have become a widely used instrument 
to promote population health. We describe the experience 
in  England,  where  the  use  of  targets  has  reached  the 
most advanced stage of development, and other European 
countries. The experience demonstrates that targets may 
change  the  behavior  of  a  health  system,  probably  to  a 
larger extent than many other policy instruments, if incen-
tives are aligned correctly and if measures to deal with 
unintended effects are put in place.
Introduction
Health targets are a tool designed to improve health and 
health system performance. They have been widely used 
in Europe, and governments that use them express a com-
mitment to achieving specified results in a defined time 
and monitoring progress toward broader goals and objec-
tives. Targets may be quantitative (eg, an increase of the 
vaccination rate by X%) or qualitative (eg, the introduction 
of a national screening program), and they may be based 
on health outcomes (eg, reduction in deaths) or processes 
(eg,  screening  activity).  The  introduction  of  the  concept 
into the health sector is often traced to the publication of 
the World Health Organization’s Health for All strategy 
in 1981 (1).
A large body of literature reflects the growing and sus-
tained interest of governments in health targets and their 
role in the health system (2). This literature distinguishes 
aspirational, managerial, and technical targets, ranked in 
terms of the extent to which they prescribe what should be 
achieved and how (3). We discuss the experience in Europe 
with health targets as a means of promoting population 
health, with a particular focus on England where the use 
of targets has reached the most advanced stage of develop-
ment (4).
Targets in the English Health System
The  first  concerted  attempt  to  introduce  targets  into 
English public health was the Health of the Nation strat-
egy, launched in 1992 (5). The intent was to encourage 
local health authorities to focus on securing good health 
for their population. Initially, 5 key areas were selected for 
action: coronary heart disease and stroke, cancer, mental 
illness, HIV/AIDS and sexual health, and accidents.
In 1998, an independent evaluation of Health of the Nation 
concluded that its “impact on policy documents peaked as 
early as 1993; and, by 1997, its impact on local policy-
making was negligible” (6). Health authorities thought they 
had more pressing concerns than public health, and there-
fore concentrated on operational issues such as reducing 
waiting times and securing budgetary control.
When Tony Blair became prime minister in 1997, his 
government  was  committed  to  evidence-based  policy, 
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systematic priority setting, and explicit performance tar-
gets throughout public services. In 1998, his government 
implemented a series of public service agreements (PSAs) 
with each ministry to signal priorities for all government 
activity. These priorities were a series of specific objectives, 
expressed as a measurable target, and were expected to be 
achieved in a designated time.
A distinctive feature of PSAs was the intent to focus on 
the outcomes of the public services, rather than opera-
tional activities. The PSA process signaled the govern-
ment’s determination to make the management of public 
services more transparent and to give departments clear 
statements of priorities. To illustrate the issues, we use 
the 2004 PSA targets in health and health care, which 
were  based  on  4  broad  objectives  (7):  1)  improve  the 
health of the population, that is, increase life expectancy 
at birth to 78.6 years for men and to 82.5 years for women 
by  2010;  2)  improve  health  outcomes  for  people  with 
long-term  conditions;  3)  improve  access  to  services,  in 
particular waiting times; and 4) improve the patient and 
user experience.
A central role of the health ministry was to devise opera-
tional instruments that transmit these national PSA tar-
gets to the local level. The most important initiative was 
developing a system of “performance ratings” for individual 
National Health Service organizations. Every organization 
was ranked annually on a 4-point scale (0-3 stars) accord-
ing to a series of approximately 40 performance indicators 
intended to reflect the objectives of the National Health 
Service, as embodied in the PSA targets (8).
Performance  ratings  have  improved  some  aspects  of 
health services (9). For example, long waits for nonurgent 
inpatient treatment were rapidly eliminated. Moreover, tar-
geted aspects of English health care have improved mark-
edly compared with health care in Wales and Scotland, 
which have no PSAs or performance ratings (10).
It has proved less straightforward, however, to estab-
lish effective local targets from objectives such as reduc-
tions in deaths from heart disease and cancer, reductions 
of health inequalities, and reductions in rates of smok-
ing,  childhood  obesity,  and  teenage  pregnancy.  Local 
managers have concentrated on readily managed aspects 
of  health  care,  and  public  health  has  not  received  the 
sustained managerial attention given to the targets for 
health service delivery (11).
The  PSA  system  has  nevertheless  led  to  sustained 
monitoring of the chosen population health targets and 
health disparities, and the ministry is held accountable 
for performance. The health inequalities targets have been 
regularly monitored by an external advisory group, but it 
is not clear why and how the targets were chosen, whether 
the observed improvements are attributable to the efforts 
of the health ministry, and what action should be taken 
when the measured performance indicated a possible fail-
ure to achieve a target (12).
A parallel initiative has been the development of a qual-
ity and outcomes framework (QOF) incentives scheme for 
primary care physicians (general practitioners). The QOF 
is one of the most ambitious attempts yet to combine clini-
cal quality targets and incentives into physician remu-
neration (13). It emphasizes clinical prevention, and the   
earnings  of  individual  practitioners  are  at  risk  if  they 
do not meet quality goals. The intention is that the pri-
mary care interventions it encourages, such as smoking 
cessation advice, blood pressure and cholesterol control, 
and  regular  monitoring  of  chronic  disease,  will  lead  to 
a  healthier  population  and  will  reduce  future  health 
care  expenditures.  Regrettably,  researchers  have  been 
hampered in efforts to evaluate its success in improving 
health by the lack of reliable baseline data against which 
to measure improvements in health attributable to the 
QOF (14).
Targets have certainly delivered noteworthy successes 
in England, such as the more equitable management of 
coronary heart disease across ethnic groups (15). However, 
alongside  the  improvements  in  many  of  the  measured 
targets are widespread reports of adverse side effects (16). 
Examples include neglect of unmeasured aspects of perfor-
mance (eg, clinical priorities being sacrificed in the pursuit 
of  reduced  waiting  times),  distorted  behavior  (such  as 
refusing to admit patients to accident departments until 
a 4-hour waiting time target was achievable), and fraud. 
Unintended  and  adverse  responses  such  as  these  were 
predictable. They reflect the potential power of targets in 
affecting behavior but also emphasize the need to consider 
the incentives inherent in any targets regime and the need 
to use counteracting instruments where necessary (17).
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from other countries (2), we discuss 6 lessons that arise 
from the use of population health targets.
Who should choose the targets?
In principle, it seems laudable for an elected government 
to set out its objectives and targets in an explicit fashion. 
Targets serve many purposes, but one is to enhance the 
accountability of government to parliament and the elec-
torate. Lack of an adequate accountability framework may 
lead to the failure of target setting to achieve its objectives. 
For example, in Hungary, where accountability arrange-
ments were not aligned with the public health focus of tar-
gets (18), achievement was monitored at the national level, 
but no mechanism secured the commitment of organiza-
tions and practitioners capable of influencing outcomes.
The  English  process  succeeded  in  that  much  of  the 
public  debate  surrounding  targets  referred  less  to  the 
principle of setting targets and more to the details of what 
those targets should be. Disagreement remains about the 
processes by which priorities are chosen and targets set. 
For example, there is an argument that the health service 
professionals  should  have  more  say  in  influencing  the 
nature of targets, when outcomes rely so heavily on their 
engagement  and  commitment.  However,  the  priorities 
and working practices of those professionals may impede 
progress  toward  better  performance.  To  some  extent, 
outcome-related  targets  seek  to  challenge  traditional 
ways of delivering services and will, therefore, at times 
come into conflict with the professions.
Some  commentators  argue  that  service  users  should 
have  more  say  in  setting  targets.  Wide  consultation 
with  user  groups  can  identify  priorities  for  improve-
ment. However, particularly in population health, setting 
objectives involves considerations beyond the immediate 
beneficiaries of a particular service, such as the taxpayer 
perspective, the interests of future users, and the interests 
of users of other services. The user perspective cannot be 
the sole influence on priority setting.
Consensus and ownership have nevertheless been seen 
as  imperative  to  elicit  acceptance  of  country-based  tar-
gets.  In  Catalonia,  health  councils  were  created  at  the 
central and provincial levels to encourage citizens’ groups 
to take an active part in target setting (19). In Flanders, 
local  health  networks  were  established  to  encourage 
the exchange of information between local organizations 
and offer a focal point for preventive actions (20). France 
established national and regional health conferences that 
allowed stakeholders the opportunity to debate existing 
health problems and foster partnerships (21).
Any government seeking to implement population health 
targets should reach consensus concerning the choice of 
objectives and the nature of the targets by consulting with 
relevant  stakeholders.  However,  uncritical  accommoda-
tion of every interest group would render the target pro-
cess meaningless; for example, it could lead to an unwieldy 
proliferation of priorities. A prime role of government is to 
balance conflicting claims on public resources, and targets 
should, in the end, be an explicit and succinct statement of 
the government’s choice in that respect.
How many targets should be chosen?
Multiple objectives are an inescapable characteristic of 
health services. However, one of the intentions of any tar-
gets regime is to focus on a limited number of objectives. 
Many schemes have failed to recognize this, for example 
in Italy (100 targets) and Andalucía (84 targets) (22). In 
England, after some early failures, later PSAs focused on 
a reduced number of targets.
If a domain is not included in the targets regime, this 
is  not  necessarily  an  indication  that  it  is  unimportant. 
Rather, the key focus of targets should be where change is 
required, and maintenance of standards in other domains 
should be secured through other instruments, such as rou-
tine regulation, inspection, or market mechanisms.
When should outcomes be used as a basis for targets?
In principle, a focus on outcomes should enable health 
care providers to look beyond traditional organizational 
boundaries and ways of delivering their services. However, 
some outcomes are intrinsically difficult to measure. Even 
if they can be measured, outcomes such as reduced deaths 
from smoking can take years to materialize, beyond the 
lifetime of most governments. Furthermore, many public 
health outcomes are particularly vulnerable to influences 
beyond the control of health agencies. Each of these diffi-
culties offers those agencies an excuse for apparent failure 
and can undermine the targets process.
Conversely,  the  use  of  process  measures  can  distort 
behavior and lead to unintended effects. For example, the VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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QOF “smoking cessation” target may have led to an undue 
emphasis  on  delivering  advisory  consultations  without 
any attention to outcomes in the form of sustained ces-
sation. If such process targets are used, additional assur-
ance may be needed to ensure that the desired outcomes 
have been secured. Although outcome measures address 
what matters and are less vulnerable to distortion, there 
will be occasions when a carefully chosen process mea-
sure — one that evidence shows is clearly linked to the 
eventual outcome — may form a more effective basis for 
a target.
How should targets be quantified?
Once objectives have been identified, a central feature of 
the debate becomes how the associated targets should be 
set, in terms of the measurement instrument to be used 
and the level of attainment to be required. The literature 
suggests that targets should be SMART — specific, mea-
surable,  achievable,  realistic,  and  timed  (3).  The  Royal 
Statistical Society (23) presents a set of desirable general 
principles for setting targets, which include following:
1.  Indicators should be directly relevant to the primary 
objective or be an obviously adequate proxy measure.
2.  Definitions need to be precise, practicable, and consis-
tent over time.
3.  Indicators should be straightforward to interpret and 
avoid perverse incentives.
4.  Indicators should be based on adequate sample sizes, 
and  technical  properties  of  the  indicator  should  be 
satisfactory.
5.  Indicators  should  not  impose  an  undue  burden  in 
terms of cost, personnel, or intrusion on those provid-
ing the information.
In practice, few targets regimes have adhered to prin-
ciples such as these. For example, Swedish public health 
targets were not explicit enough to act as a lever for opera-
tional action (24). Some targets might be little more than 
unattainable aspirations, while others can be secured with 
little effort on the part of ministries. Furthermore, conflict-
ing pressures exist in any targets regime. To be effective 
managerial instruments, targets should be stretching but 
attainable, suggesting (for example) a 1 in 3 risk of failure. 
However, few governments would want to be confronted 
with such a high proportion of failures. From an account-
ability perspective, a government would wish to think that 
all targets could be attained.
This scenario occurred in the Netherlands during the 
early  1990s,  where  the  secretary  of  state  for  health 
avoided  using  quantitative  health  targets  because  of 
the  political  accountability  those  targets  would  create 
(3).  Similarly,  Russia  has  experienced  politically  driven 
target  setting,  where  the  targets  set  were  neither  rel-
evant nor necessary. Health was seldom a priority on the 
policy agenda in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
or  subsequently  in  the  Russian  Federation,  and  gener-
ally,  when  targets  were  set  they  were  broadly  defined, 
infrastructure-oriented,  and  almost  never  outcome- 
oriented. In many cases, the targets required no change in 
policy to achieve them (25). It is difficult to see how this 
tension can be satisfactorily resolved, unless the political 
process becomes mature enough to recognize that some 
failure is inevitable and not necessarily adverse if progress 
is being secured.
How should cross-ministerial targets be handled?
Given  the  many  determinants  of  health,  involving 
actions  by  organizations  in  various  sectors,  effective 
coordination among responsible actors has emerged as 
a key issue. In particular, a focus on health outcomes 
sometimes gives rise to strategies that are not obviously 
attached to a particular ministry, leading to the need 
to  specify  “joint”  targets  that  transcend  departmental 
boundaries.  These  are  particularly  important  in  the 
public  health  domain.  An  assessment  of  the  English 
childhood obesity PSA target found no ready solutions 
but  advocated  much  stronger  collaboration  between 
national and local government and stronger engagement 
with nongovernmental organizations (26). Cross-sectoral 
targets give rise to problems of coordination, persuasion, 
and engagement that must be addressed if they are to 
be successful.
Where this coordination takes place will depend on the 
governance  structures  already  in  place  and  the  forums 
in which key actors can meet. This may be easier where 
responsibility for health lies in local or regional govern-
ment, as in Scandinavia. Other countries have faced a dif-
ferent challenge with intersectoral targets. Although they 
have stressed the need to involve the many sectors whose 
actions contribute to health, they have often not included 
the health care sector itself. By not including that sector, 
health targets become a peripheral issue, thereby diluting 
the potential effect of that sector (27).VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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How should national objectives be transmitted to local 
organizations?
Attainment of national targets usually relies on improve-
ment in local organizations charged with delivering ser-
vices. It would, however, be inappropriate to set the same 
targets for every locality regardless of its existing level of 
attainment and the difficulty of the local circumstances. 
Organizations  already  performing  well  would  have  no 
incentive  to  improve,  whilst  those  with  disadvantaged 
populations might stand no chance of success and become 
alienated. If such regimes were sustained, it may become 
difficult  to  recruit  key  managers  and  professionals  in 
disadvantaged areas, exacerbating existing problems. As 
a result, many countries have introduced more subtle tar-
gets regimes for local organizations, seeking to encourage 
all organizations to improve in the chosen measures, from 
whatever baseline they start.
The tension between national objectives and local discre-
tion has become an unresolved issue in targets regimes. 
In England, the “must do” nature of local health targets 
put pressure on some local organizations, precluding any 
serious consideration of separate local priorities. The pre-
vailing lack of flexibility was highlighted in a report by 
the Audit Commission (28) that criticized the neglect of 
local government discretion in earlier PSA targets. There 
is now increased interest in England on public reporting 
of local levels of attainment, regardless of which agency 
is nominally accountable (29). In short, targets programs 
have often been disseminated in a top-down manner with 
little  effort  to  ensure  involvement  of  key  actors  at  the 
grassroots level (27). For the future, a sense of ownership 
and accountability needs to be developed among those who 
implement health targets.
Conclusion
Health targets have become a widely used instrument to 
promote population health. The lessons we have described 
demonstrate that targets may secure a real change in the 
behavior of a health system, probably to a larger extent 
than  many  other  policy  instruments,  if  incentives  are 
aligned correctly and if measures to deal with unintended 
effects are put in place.
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